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 Il presente lavoro esplora l’attività della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione Europea nel 
colmare le lacune del diritto privato europeo. Affronta il processo di dialogo, collaborazione 
e conflitto fra giudici europei e nazionali, così come i fattori che possono modificare tale 
rapporto. Riflette sull’esistenza di una forma di ‘equity europea’, in rapporto ai concetti di 
aequitas ed equity utilizzati rispettivamente nei sistemi giuridici di civil law e di common 
law. L’analisi si concentra sui settori della responsabilità dello Stato per violazione del 
diritto dell’Unione e sul diritto dei contratti e sulla tutela dei consumatori, in modo da 
esaminare le reciproche influenze fra giudici nazionali ed europei, e fra istituzioni operanti 
su diversi livelli di legalità. 
 
Keywords: CJEU  - European Private Law  - State Liability -  Contract Law and 
Consumer Protection – Equity 
 
 The aim of  this working paper is to explore the judicial activism of  the Court of  
Justice of  the European Union and some leading cases within the European legal system. 
The paper will look at the “negotiation process” between European and national judges, 
and at factors that can modify this relationship; the paper also seeks to identify a legitimate 
form of  ‘European equity’ inspired by the different notions of  “equity” which have 
developed within the civil and the common law traditions. The areas of  State Liability for 
breach of  European law, of  Contract Law and of  Consumer Protection will be drawn 
on in order to better understand the “Europeanization of  law”, that is, the product of  
reciprocal influence between national and supranational judges, and national and 
European institutions. 
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  This working paper collects the key ideas and reflections we presented at 
the international conference “Filling the Gaps: The Study of  Judicial Creativity 
and Equity in Mixed Jurisdictions and Beyond”, which took place in Catania, on 
May 27-28, 20131. The conference explored sources, methods and approaches 
used by the courts in so-called “mixed jurisdictions”2 when they face a lacuna in 
the law.  
Our reflections in this paper3 relate to the Europeanization of  law4, which 
seems to be evolving remarkably quickly and applying to various areas of  law 
outside the areas of  “conferred competence”, especially because of  the creative 
function of  both national and supranational courts. The Europeanization of  
law is not to be confused with the fact that the Court of  Justice of  the European 
                                                 
1 This conference has been organized by the Protection Project at the John Hopkins University 
School of  Advanced International Studies (SAIS), in cooperation with the World Society of  
Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists (WSMJJ), and the Tulane University Law School Eason Weinmann 
Center for Comparative Law.  
2 We consider the European Union as a “mixed-legal system”, cf. E. Orücü, et al (eds.) Studies 
in legal systems. Mixed and Mixing, Kluwer law International, The Hague, 1996. See also Vernon 
V. Palmer (ed.), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: the Third Legal Family, 2nd ed., Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2012, pp. 19 ff. 
3 A more detailed version of our article will be found in the book "Filling the Gaps: Judicial 
Creativity and Equity in Mixed Jurisdictions and Beyond", where all the Conference papers 
will be published (2014). 
4 W. van Gerven, The ECJ Case-Law as a Means of  Unification of  Private Law? Chapter 6, pp. 101 
ff., in A, S. Hartkamp & E. Hondius (eds.), Towards A European Civil Code, 3rd ed., Nijmegen: 
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Union (hereinafter the CJEU) is exclusively competent on certain issues. By the 
expression “Europeanization of  law” we refer to the phenomenon by which 
national laws are aligned to EU law through the process of  interpretation carried 
out by national judges5.  
This process of  interpreting national law according to European 
principles applies mainly in two circumstances: a) in interpretation in 
compliance with EU law of  national rules which result from implementation of  
a Directive; b) in interpretation of  national rules which have no apparent 
functional link with EU law, that is, rules which do not derive from an express 
or implied obligation to comply with European law. This situation occurs each 
time a pre-existing internal rule would be in conflict with a later European rule 
that has not yet been implemented, if  interpreted according to national criteria. 
The internal rule would thus be incompatible with the European rule, still to be 
implemented. In such a case, the national judge must adapt the interpretation 
of  the national rule, so that he or she may continue to apply the national rule 
without running the risk that the CJEU will rule against it6.  
When interpreting general principles, which the CJEU reads into or 
deduces from the structure and features of  the European legal order, the Court’s 
preference for interpreting wording precisely leaves space for a different kind 
of  interpretation that balances conflicting interests.  
On the national side, many civil codes provide a hierarchical set of  rules 
on this matter. Some examples are: Art. 12 of  Disposizioni Preliminari of  the 
Italian Civil Code, Arts. 6 and 7 of  the Austrian ABGB, Art. 1 of  the Swiss Civil 
Code, and Arts. 1 and 4 of  the Spanish Civil Code7. At international level, the 
                                                 
5 Judicial style has also been changing in recent decades with the Europeanization of  the law. 
The complexity of  the issues arising in litigation in Europe, and the way in which litigation is 
conducted (mainly document-based trials) coupled with efficient databases, bear much of  the 
responsibility for the ever-growing length of  modern judgments, both at European and at 
national levels. We have more expansive judgments than before, that we could classify as 
“tonsorial or agglutinative” (Chief  Justice Cardozo, Law and Literature, 1925, reprinted in 48 
Yale L.J. 489 at 493 (1939)), because they emerge “from the shears and the paste pot which are 
its implements and emblem” (i.e. by scissors and paste). On the increasing length of  
judgments, cf. Lady Justice Arden D.B.E., Judgment Writing: Are Shorter Judgments Achievable? in 
Law Quarterly Review, vol. 128, pp. 515 ff. 
6 The ruling which formulated this duty for national judges related to the Marleasing case (1990) 
Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, C-106/89 [1990] ECR I-4135. 
Rather than a presumption of  conformity, here the principle of  the supremacy of  EU law over 
national law is operating. 
7 In this respect, the two main European models of  interpretation, the French and the German, 
the first a passive model of  interpretation (cf. art. 4 of  the Code civil that forces the judge to 
undertake a normative role if  the law is obscure, and art. 5 that prevents the judge from 
overstepping the scope of  the judicial power) and the second a theoretical activist  model, 
which the Pandectists developed in the 19th century, have found their boundaries blurred by 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (1969, Arts. 31, 32 and 33) does the 
same8.  
However, the European legal system, in itself, does not define the notion 
of  “gap” in its Treaties. And there are no explicit CJEU rulings addressing the 
question of  how to fill the gaps: indeed, in CJEU case-law we could not find 
any “coherent system” of  hermeneutic criteria used to fill them. In other words, 
neither the European legislature nor the CJEU have clearly defined what a “gap” 
is. This is not surprising because the CJEU, both in its manner of  applying the 
preliminary ruling procedure, and in its judging techniques, is not formalistic: its 
judicial criteria are inferred by legal scholars, and there is no official taxonomy 
of  the rules of  interpretation9.  
This situation raises another question related to the possible existence of  
a kind of  ‘equitable jurisdiction’ or ’European equity’10, understood in both the 
civilian and the common law meanings. In fact, the term has at least two 
different meanings: aequitas as in the civil law tradition, and equity to refer to the 
equitable jurisdiction of  the Chancellor in the development of  English common 
law. 
We have tested our hypotheses through a concrete approach, drawing on 
the CJEU’s judgments and the reaction of  the national courts in two areas of  
law, State Liability, and Contract Law and Consumer Protection, which are of  
great concern to EU citizens, whose economic and social future may well be 
shaped by them. The reasons for this choice depend on a range of  factors, which 
can be summarized by saying that while the former is one of  the fields where 
judicial creativity has been evident from the nineties on, it is in the latter that 
the application of  general principles has been producing innovative 
consequences, especially during the last decade. In other words, while the field 
of  State Liability provides clear examples of  judicial activism and of  negotiation 
between European and national judges, we find a less developed but potentially 
                                                 
8 As recent literature testifies, there is continuing scholarly interest in interpretation, sometimes 
at the cost of  over-theorizing. See R. Kolb, Interprétation et création du droit international. Esquisse 
d’une herméneutique juridique moderne pour le droit international public, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006; C. 
Fernández de Casadevante i Romani, Sovereignty and Interpretation of  International Norms, Berlin, 
Springer, 2007; R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008; U. 
Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of  Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, Dordrecht, Springer, 2007; A. Orakhelashvili, The 
Interpretation of  Acts and Rules in Public International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
9 Formal limitation of  CJEU interpretative activity is indicated by the areas of  competence 
attributed by the Treaties, according to Art. 5 (2) TEU. Cf. the Order of  the Court (Third 
Chamber) of  12 July 2012 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di 
Brescia, Italy), Gennaro Currà and Others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-466/11, 12.7.2012, 
OJ C 347, 26.11.2011. 
10 The expression ‘European equity’ does not appear either in primary, or in secondary 
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more productive arena for judicial creativity in Consumer Protection and the 
Law of  Contract11. 
This is the starting point of  our analysis on the function of  gap-filling in 
the European legal space and on the potential existence of  a form of  equity 
within the European legal system. We will first consider the various 
interpretative criteria and methods of  filling legal gaps used by the CJEU. 
 
2. Judicial creativity in Europe, interpretative methods and the problem 
of legal gaps 
  When judging on many issues in European law, the CJEU has to fill 
lacunae left by Treaties and legislative acts. This means that judicial creativity first 
appears at European level, because the CJEU fills gaps left by the primary and 
secondary sources of  European law, as well as gaps left by its jurisprudence. 
Secondly, gap-filling relates to the multi-layer system of  negotiation between the 
CJEU and national courts which has been established through the preliminary 
ruling procedure. As is known, the preliminary ruling, which has no equivalent 
in national legal orders12, is the tool enabling communication and cooperation 
                                                 
11 After much (still unresolved) debate, the area of  contract law is understood as comprising 
consumer protection as well (both B2B and B2C transactions). This seems the outcome of  
the so-called Draft Common Frame of  Reference for a European Contract Law, developed by 
the Joint Network on European Private Law: cf. C. von Bar, E. Clive, H. Schulte-Nölke (eds.), 
Principles, Definitions and model Rules of  European Private law, Draft Common Frame of  Reference 
(DCFR), 2nd ed., Munich, Sellier, 2009. At national level, it is reflected in the adoption of  the 
“monist model”, under which rules on consumer protection are inserted into the Civil code: 
this is the case of  the BGB; however, see the plea for the reshaping of  consumer law in a 
special statute outside the BGB: H. - W. Micklitz, The Future of  Consumer Law - plea for a movable 
system, in Journal of  European Consumer and Market Law, 2013, pp. 5-11. The “dualist model” is 
more common in Europe: this is the case of  France, Italy and Spain, for example, which have 
a separate Consumer Code. Although English private law remains largely uncodified, the 
question of  whether consumer law and contract law can be addressed together in one statute 
has been an issue at times: see for instance the Sales of  Goods Act 1979. Recently, the UK has 
announced a new “Consumer Rights Bill” (to be presented before 2015): the specific 
consumer-related provisions of  the Sales of  Goods Act 1979 would be rewritten as part of  
this new act; it would provide an opportunity to bring together a range of  measures 
implementing the various directives, as well as the enforcement provisions from the Enterprise 
Act 2002, and the criminal law sanctions found in the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008. Cf. C. Twigg-Flesner, Comment on “The future of  consumer law: plea for 
a movable system” in Journal of  European Consumer and Market Law, 2013, pp. 12-14. 
12 “This court structure is different from national systems of  administration of  justice. These are characterised 
by compartmentalisation and decentralisation. There are specialised courts for particular areas, such as tax, 
intellectual property law, labour law and social security, and distinctions may be made between private law 
courts and administrative ones. Multi-tiered systems of  appeal result in only a very small proportion of  cases 
reaching the more senior courts. The preliminary reference procedure, by contrast, allows all courts and tribunals 
within the European Union, no matter how high or low, to make a reference to a single court: the Court of  
Justice. The Community court structure is, therefore, a flat court structure of  “first, and then equals”, in which 
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between the CJEU and the national courts13. Through it, in cases involving EU 
law, national courts, if in doubt as to the interpretation or validity of the law, 
can or, in some cases, must seek a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the 
relevant issue (Art. 267 TFEU).  
   During the last few decades, the preliminary ruling has progressively 
acquired a fundamental role in shaping the European legal order. This is a 
double-faced tool for the national courts. Through it, the CJEU rules on 
interpretation and application of European law, and answers questions 
formulated by national courts; however, national judges maintain the last word 
on the compatibility of national rules with European law. Thus, national courts 
can reconcile the CJEU’s case law with the particular features of national legal 
orders and the facts of the case before them14. As a consequence, judicial 
creativity has developed on two levels: the supranational level of the CJEU, and 
the national level of the 28 judiciaries of the Member States, which are governed 
by different procedural rules, and structured according to different models of 
constitutional review (such as diffuse or concentrated) and different bodies of 
professional and non-professional judges15. 
This complex interaction is the basis for a cultural exchange which 
enhances reciprocal influence both from national judges on European 
institutions, and from the CJEU on national jurisprudence and national legal 
orders in general16. As we will see below, the mechanism called “cross-
fertilization” consists in a deeper and more pervasive dynamic of mutual 
                                                 
law can disenfranchise any national court of  the possibility of  making reference”. D. Chalmers, A. Tomkins, 
European Union Public Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, 291 - 292. 
13 H.G. Schermers, D.F. Waelbrock, Judicial Protection in the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague – London – New York, 2001, 228. As is well known, the preliminary 
ruling is the main or rather the only means of  communication and cooperation between the 
CJEU and the national courts. The preliminary ruling procedure enables national courts to 
question the Court of  Justice on the interpretation or validity of  European law. Accordingly, 
the incidental nature of  the preliminary ruling, which can be promoted in the context of  a 
conflict between private parties or a private party and public authorities, makes the national 
courts initiative crucial, not only related to the frequency of  the rulings, but also to technique 
and ability skill in consulting the CJEU. 
14K. Lenaerts, T. Corthaut, Toward an Internally Consistent Doctrine on Invoking Norms of  EU Law, 
in S. Prechal, B. Van Roermund, The Coherence of  EU Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent 
Concepts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 495 - 515, 501. 
15 Each judiciary in Europe is nested with a set of  relationships to a legal community, to 
institutions, and to the wider society. Cf. J. Bell, Judiciaries within Europe. A Comparative Review, 
CSICL, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. On different models of  judicial review 
(top-down v. bottom-up models, i.e. the traditional French model v. the emerging “dialogue” 
model) see R. Caranta, A. Gerbrandy (eds.), Traditions and Change in European Administrative Law, 
Europa Law Publ., 2011. Cf. also V. Barsotti, V. Varano (a cura di), Il nuovo ruolo delle Corti 
supreme nell'ordine politico e istituzionale, collana Annuario di diritto comparato e studi legislativi, ESI, 
Napoli, 2012. 
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imitation, which goes considerably further than balancing principles17. Thus, the 
preliminary ruling is the procedure by which the CJEU fills the gaps, although 
European law does not lay down any system or formal procedure for filling the 
gaps either in its Treaties or in its legislative acts.  
As some scholars have noted, “activism” in relation to the CJEU indicates 
judgments issued with no basis in the Treaties or in the secondary binding 
measures based on the Treaties18. These sources make no provision on many 
matters, and this is when the Court is activist or pro-active. Moreover, the CJEU 
is also activist when a legal rule based on the Treaties or secondary binding 
measures exists and is interpreted broadly, in a teleological way, to justify a 
conclusion that would be contrary to the literal meaning of  the legal rule itself.  
  
The interpretative methods used by the CJEU19 have been studied by 
many commentators, who generally agree that there are at least three types of  
interpretative criteria used by the CJEU: (i) semiotic or linguistic arguments; (ii) 
systemic and context-establishing arguments; (iii) teleological, functional or 
consequentialist arguments20. While the first two are less employed today, the 
CJEU often employs purposive considerations, in line with a generally 
functional view of  European law. CJEU judgments reflect the effet utile approach, 
because the main objective in the CJEU’s interpretation and development of  
law is the practical effectiveness of  European law. In reality, it is often not easy 
to distinguish between the teleological and the systemic method in the European 
legal order because “there is a clear association between the systemic (context) 
and teleological elements of  interpretation in the Court’s reasoning. It is not 
simply the telos of  the rules to be interpreted that matters, but also the telos of  
the legal context in which those rules exist”21. In the same way, effet utile and 
teleological methods are intertwined because teleological interpretation focuses 
                                                 
17 “Transplants involve the transposition of  a doctrine from one legal system into another. (…) Cross-
fertilisation implies a different, more indirect process. It implies that an external stimulus promotes an evolution 
within the receiving legal system. The evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in 
its own way. The new development is a distinctive but organic product of  that system rather than a bolt-on. 
This process often gives rise to greater convergence between the receiving legal system and the external stimulus, 
but this need not to be the case”. J. Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of  Administrative Law in Europe, 
in J. Beatson, T. Tridimas, New directions in European Public Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998, 
pp. 147 - 165, 147. 
18 On judicial activism see recently M. Dawson, B. De Witte & E. Muir (eds.), Judicial Activism 
at The European Court of  Justice, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publ., 2013. 
19 For a synthesis, cf. H. Rösler, Interpretation of  EU Law, in J. Basedow, K..J. Hopt & R. 
Zimmermann, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of  European Private Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012, pp. 979-982, at 979. 
20 This classification is described in J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of  the European Court of  
Justice, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, 233.  
21 M. Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of  Constitutional 
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on the purposes of  the EU, and the principle of  effectiveness is intended to 
protect these purposes from Member States’ autonomy. 
   Furthermore, because of  the particular nature of  the Treaties, 
characterized by many vague concepts and principles, the CJEU tends to 
examine the whole context in which a particular provision applies, and to give 
the interpretation which is most likely to support what the Court considers that 
provision sought to achieve22. For this reason, it may be inappropriate to analyse 
judicial creativity by focusing on the single interpretative approaches. It is 
difficult and perhaps unreasonable to define separately all the specific criteria 
adopted in each judgment, because the CJEU, despite sometimes being explicit 
about its interpretative approach, tends to avoid any explicit statement of  the 
weight attributed to the different criteria23. However, it is possible to analyse gap 
filling through the CJEU’s actual practice, which consists of  balancing 
conflicting principles, mainly of  public law origin, such as supremacy, 
proportionality, equal treatment, efficacy, effectiveness, non-discrimination, 
equality, and equivalence. During the last decade, the CJEU has also relied on 
principles pertaining to the private law realm, such as nemo venire contra factum 
proprium, freedom of  contract, freedom of  form, abuse of  right, good faith and 
fair dealing, unjust enrichment, or restitution and so forth. These principles are 
used to foster the construction of  a European system of  private law, with a view 
towards the final goal of  integration. In other words, the CJEU uses principles 
to fill the gaps in EU law with substance, to refine existing national private law 
rules, and to create a multi-level system that should strive to ensure equity and 
justice. 
 
3. Does a ‘European equity’ exist? 
As we said in the introduction, our reflections on the function of  gap-
filling in the European legal space developed through our considering the 
potential existence of  a form of  ‘European equity’. Is it possible and fruitful to 
do this? To give an answer to this question is neither easy, nor idle. The possible 
existence of  a European equity emerges in the architecture of  the European 
legal system, as well as in judicial interaction among judges. However, the fact 
that in CJEU case-law the term “equity” is not used explicitly as a parameter for 
deciding cases makes recognition of  the existence of  a ‘European equity’ rather 
complex, especially because of  its different meanings in common and civil law 
traditions. 
                                                 
22 P. Craig, G.. De Burca, Eu Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 
Oxford, 2011, 64. 
23 In CILFIT (para. 20), the CJEU stated: “every provision of  community law must be placed in its 
context and interpreted in the light of  the provisions of  community law as a whole, regard being had to the 
objectives thereof  and to its state of  evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied”. 
This excerpt was commented on in G. Conway, The Limits of  Legal Reasoning and the European 
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This recognition seems necessary in order to explain some aspects and 
dynamics of  judicial creativity in EU law. We must define what we mean by 
European equity. Firstly, we need to distinguish between the common law and 
civil law meanings; and secondly, between European and national levels. 
According to the jurist Celsus (one of  the most prominent jurists of  the early 
second century AD), jus est ars boni et aequi; the Latin term aequitas in ancient 
Rome referred to a flexible concept used by judges to apply the law in the 
interest of justice, and not in a mechanical or automatic fashion. In its process 
of adjudication, the CJEU is always guided by principles which must be fair. 
Europe’s equitable adjudication, like aequitas, consists in the exercise of 
balancing conflicting principles. So this is the civil law side of the meaning of 
‘European equity’. Furthermore, the functioning of this equitable jurisdiction is 
influenced by another key factor: interaction with national judges. As said above, 
preliminary rulings enable this interaction (Art. 267 TFEU), and permit 
European and national judges to influence each other in the development and 
assimilation of shared principles. Hence, by studying preliminary rulings, it is 
possible to understand the interactive, collaborative or conflictive relationships 
between supranational and national courts. Here the traditional English 
common law meaning of  equity can be seen, in the sense of  a concurrent 
jurisdiction which sought to solve disputes and created new remedies, items and 
doctrines, such as specific performance and injunction, trust, and undue 
influence24. In our opinion, the CJEU’s activity may be compared with that of 
the Court of Chancery which, from the 14th century, competed with the 
common law Courts, and progressively built a solid and complex system of 
rules. In fact, the equity of the Chancellor (“the keeper of the King’s 
conscience”) and the equity of the CJEU share a similar function, that is the 
development of legal doctrines and remedies which complete a legal system, 
intervening where other sources of law have left lacunae. A further analogy 
between the CJEU’s and the Lord Chancellor’s jurisdiction is that both courts 
develop their creative function but formally respect the legal order where they 
operate.  
                                                 
24 As Maitland pointed out: “We ought not to think of  common law and equity as of  two rival systems. 
(…) Equity had come not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it. Every jot and every title of  law was to be obeyed, 
but when all this had been done yet something might be needful, something that equity would require.” Equity 
formally respected every word of  the common law and every right at law, but where the law 
was defective equity provided equitable rights and remedies. See F. W. Maitland, The Forms of  
Action at Common Law. A Course of  Lectures, ed. A. H. Chaytor, W. J. Whittaker, Cambridge 
University Press, 1936. Even after James I, when the King solved the tension between the two 
rival jurisdictions, according to the maxim “Equity follows the law”, the Court of  Chancery 
was bound by the rules established by common law courts. However, the maxim was operative 
in a “narrow sense”. In reality, the Court of  Chancery could use its discretion in order to 
provide relief  against abuse of  the law or to allay its strictness. While in ordinary circumstances 
“Equity follows the law” without infringing rights that had been legally acquired, that maxim 
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State liability for breach of European law is an area where judicial creativity 
has developed through the balancing of conflicting principles; on the contrary, 
Consumer Protection and the Law of Contract is an area where judicial creativity 
has emerged only recently. As we will see below, they both provide examples of 
judge-made law through a ‘diffuse equity’, understood as the negotiation process 
between judges within the EU multi-layer judicial system.  
 
4 The function of gap-filling at national level 
As stated above, it is possible to find a form of equity in the common law 
sense at national level, in the judicial creativity that national courts show when 
they fill gaps. In what we have called ‘diffuse equity’, national judges are in a 
sense decentralized European judges25, because they must apply European law, 
which means they must interpret and fill gaps when interpreting and applying 
European rules26. In this case, filling gaps also relates to the multi-layer system 
of  negotiation between the CJEU and national courts, established along with 
the transformation of  the preliminary ruling procedure. As is well known, in 
general terms, the CJEU’s arguments and precedents influence national law and 
individuals’ rights through their incorporation into the decision-making process 
of  national courts. This means that the vaguer or more open that European 
rules are, the more freedom national courts will enjoy in applying them. In order 
to guarantee achievement of  the goals of  European policies, the CJEU can 
decide to be more pro-active in judging a preliminary ruling. The transformation 
of  the preliminary ruling procedure27 was effected by the CJEU (under the 
previous Treaties, the European Court of  Justice) which over the years created 
                                                 
25 B. De Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of  the Legal Order, in G. De Burca, P. Craig, 
The Evolution of  EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd ed., 2011, pp. 323 - 362. 
26 More precisely, “the national court is charged with ensuring respect for Community law in various ways: 
it is required to apply Community law; it must set aside national legislation incompatible with Community 
law; it is under the duty to interpret national law in conformity with Community law; and it is charged with 
finding a Member State in breach of  Community law in accordance with the principle of  State liability. In 
essence, the national court serves as the “juge de droit commun” in the Union legal order”. K. Lenaerts, The 
rule of  law and the coherence of  the Judicial System of  the European Union, in CML Rev., 44, 2007, pp. 
1625 – 1659, 1645. 
27 It was created in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as part of  the review role 
of  the Court: individuals could challenge the validity of  High Authority (the predecessor of  
the Commission) decisions in national courts and have these challenges referred directly to the 
Court of  Justice (see K.J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of  European Law. The Making of  an 
International Rule of  Law in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, at 9). Only with the 
Treaty of  Rome, it was expanded to include questions of  interpretation, reinforcing the ECJ’s 
role of  filling the gaps, although the Commission remained the primary body responsible for 
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the direct effect28 and supremacy doctrines29. The Court realized the metamorphosis 
through those techniques of  legal interpretation mentioned above. From the 
1963 Van Gend en Loos case, through Costa v. Enel, and then the Simmenthal 
decision in 197830, it granted access to private litigants to use European rules in 
order to challenge national rules and policies. Consequently, this has changed 
how CJEU decisions have been enforced31. The CJEU used a teleological 
approach, where the goal was to foster European integration and to increase the 
effectiveness of  the European legal system32. Now that the authority of  the 
CJEU is well established, the new issue arises: it is becoming part of  an emerging 
system of  checks and balances within the European multi-layer jurisdiction.  
The activity carried out by the CJEU in private law is twofold: it formulates 
fundamental principles through comparison of  national legal systems and it 
creates legal rules based on EU statutory interpretation33. This raises the 
normative issue of  the limits of  EU intervention in national private law. Our 
concern in this paper is not to clarify the notion of  “principle”, or whether any 
difference exists, in abstract terms, between “general principles”, “governing 
                                                 
28 It established that European Law can create rights for individuals that could be invoked 
before national courts under certain conditions. The CJEU established rules for when Treaties’ 
provisions, regulations and directives can create (vertical and horizontal) direct effects, for 
example depending on the clarity of  the legal text, or the unconditional nature of  the 
obligation. See among others, Craig & De Burca, EU Law cit., supra. 
29 It established that European Law is the supreme law and has precedence over national law, 
even subsequent changes of  national law: through revolutionary decisions, the CJEU allowed 
the Court itself  and the national courts to monitor and enforce European law in the national 
setting, stating that Member States cannot escape their obligations by non-compliance. See 
among others J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of  Europe, in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 100, No. 8, 
Symposium: International Law, 1991, pp. 2403-2483. 
30 See T. de la Mare & C. Donnelly, Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution and 
Stasis, in Craig & De Burca, The Evolution of  EU law cit., supra, pp. 363-406. 
31 As is well known, resistance by some Member State Constitutional Courts towards the 
supremacy doctrine came to an end in the 1980’s, when the vast majority of  national judiciaries 
agreed to take on the role of  enforcing European law in national territory. Legal scholars have 
identified many different variables that influenced national acceptance of  this doctrine: a) the 
influence of  the monist doctrine, where international law is already part of  the national legal 
system and hierarchically supreme to national law, or the dualist doctrine, where international 
law is not part of  the national legal system and requires incorporation into national law; b) the 
influence of  a tradition of  judicial review; c) government positions on European integration, 
because political factors shape judicial interpretation; d) the fact that some States entered the 
European Economic Community before European law was declared supreme to national law: 
for example, British legal scholars debated the doctrine of  supremacy during the accession 
period, so it was part of  what the UK accepted when it joined the Community. See further in 
Alter, Establishing the Supremacy cit., supra, pp. 28 ff. 
32 D. Wincott, The Role or The Rule of  the Court of  Justice: An ‘Institutional’ Account of  Judicial Politics 
in the European Community, in Journal of  Public Policy 2(4), 1995, pp. 583-602; P. Craig, Once Upon 
a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of  EEC Law, in Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies, 
12(4), 1992, pp. 453-479. 
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principles” and “underlying principles” or “overriding principles”34. Basically, 
all the principles mentioned in the judgments are of  a highly political nature, for 
the protection of  human rights, the promotion of  solidarity and social 
responsibility, and the enhancement of  an increasingly consumer-friendly and 
socially-oriented common internal market. What is at stake here is the 
relationship between the European market framework and national welfare 
systems, or - in other words - between, on the one hand, the core-issue of  EU 
law, which is procedural justice35 and the fairness of  the institutional decision-
making process36, and, on the other hand, the more substantial current concern 
of  national States, namely the social exclusion of  citizens, workers and 
consumers, who risk being cut off  from labor and consumer markets37. 
The growing contentiousness around sensitive areas of  national control 
opens another phase of  European integration, where conflicting legal 
interpretations voiced by the CJEU, national courts, national governments and 
the EU Commission play a decisive role in changing the boundaries between 
national sovereignty and European law38.  
 
5 An example of the activism of the Court of Justice: the Francovich 
doctrine 
State liability for breach of  European Union law has provided particularly 
fertile ground for gap-filling and judicial creativity in general. As is well known, 
the EC Treaty makes no provision on Member States liability for damages to 
injured parties for breach of  EU law. However, the CJEU has intervened to 
                                                 
34 On this point, among others see S. Whittaker, Operation of  the Common European Sales Law, in 
CML Rev., 2013, pp. 85-108; K. Lenaerts & J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Constitutional Allocation of  
Powers and General Principles of  EU, Law, in CML Rev 2012, pp. 1629-1669; A.S. Hartkamp, The 
General Principles of  EU Law and Private Law, in RabelsZ 2011, pp. 241-259; J. Basedow, The Court 
of  Justice and Private Law: vacillations, General principles and the Architecture of  the European Judiciary, 
in ERPL, 2010, pp. 443-475; M. Safjan & P. Miklaszewicz, Horizontal effect of  the General Principles 
of  EU law in the sphere of  Private Law, in ERPL, 2010, pp. 475-486. Before, cf. B. Fauvarque-
Cosson & D. Mazeaud (eds.), European Contract Law Materials for a Common Frame of  Reference: 
Terminology, Guiding Principles and Model Rules, Sellier, Munich, 2008; C. von Bar, E. Clive, H. 
Schulte-Noelke (eds.), Principles, Definitions and model Rules of  European Private law, Draft Common 
Frame of  Reference (DCFR), 2nd ed., Munich, Sellier, 2009.  
35 On “welfarism” in private law see T. Wilhelmsson, Varieties of  Welfarism in European Contract 
Law, in European Law Journal, 10 (6), pp. 712-733, 2004, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=605144 and R. Brownsword, G. Howells, T. Wilhelmsson, Welfarism 
in Contract Law, Dartmouth, University of  Michigan, 1994. 
36 See in more general terms J. L. Gibson, Understandings of  Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, 
Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, in Law & Society Review, 23(3), 1989, pp. 469-496. 
37 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Judicial Activism of  the European Court of  Justice and the Development of  the 
European Social Mode in Anti-Discrimination and Consumer Law, in EUI LAW 2009/19, at 11. 
38 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, D. Patterson, From the Nation State to the Market: The evolution of  EU private 
law, in EUI LAW 2012/15, at 13 ff. They identified four parameters to describe the interaction 
between “nation state private law regimes” and “market state European private law regimes”: 
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argue that this is inherent to the EC Treaty39, holding that it must be possible to 
take legal action against States to seek damages for breach of  EC law40.  
The European Court of  Justice has been active in this area since 1991, 
when it first established the conditions under which liability gives rise to the 
right to reparation41. As noted by many scholars of  renown, the CJEU strategy, 
which was first to establish that States which infringe EC law incur liability just 
as European institutions do (Art. 340 TFEU, previously Art. 288 TEC), is 
another example of the CJEU’s function of gap filling42. This activism 
developed even further when the Court clarified the conditions that must be 
fulfilled for the right to reparation to be effective, and applied the right to new 
kinds of  breaches and to the State’s behavior in any function or political form43.  
In the Brasserie du Pêcheur case, the CJEU stated that Community law 
confers a right to reparation where three conditions are met: (i) the rule or law 
infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; (ii) the breach must 
be sufficiently serious; and (iii) there must be a direct causal link between the 
breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the 
injured parties44. This vagueness, although criticized by commentators, is 
essential in order to protect the claimant better than Member State law does45, 
enhancing interaction and communication with national courts. In other words, 
the strategy established by the CJEU, based on the minimal guidance provided 
by these three basic conditions, has permitted progressive extension and 
                                                 
39 Judgment of  the Court of  19 November 1991, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others 
v. Italian Republic, Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, ECR 1991, I-05357, para. 37. 
40 M. Ross, Beyond Francovich, in Modern Law Review, 56, 1993, pp. 55 - 73. 
41 Francovich cit., supra. 
42 Commentators noted that “the tort rules laid down in the two lines of  case law, one relating 
to Community institutions and the other relating to Member States, are used by the Court, 
back and forth, as a source of  inspiration”. W. van Gerven, The Emergence of  a Common European 
law in the Area of  Tort Law: the EU Contribution, in D. Fairgrieve, M. Andenas and J. Bell, Tort 
Liability of  Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, BIICL, London, 2002, pp. 125 - 147, 132. 
This analogy produces several consequences. For example, the Court ruled that the State is 
liable whichever of  its organs is responsible for the breach and regardless of  the internal 
division of  powers between constitutional authorities. R.W. Davis, Liability in Damages for a 
Breach of  Community Law: Some Reflection on the Question of  Who to Sue and the Concept of  "the State", 
in European Law Review, 31, 2006, pp. 69 - 80. 
43 As we will see in the following sections, from the Brasserie du Pêcheur case, the Court 
established that “individuals suffering loss or injury thereby are entitled to reparation where the rule of  
Community law breached is intended to confer rights upon them, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a 
direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the individuals”. Brasserie du Pêcheur, 
para. 4. 
44 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 51.  
45 In other words, the CJEU is sanctioning the State’s failure to act under a test of  liability in 
order to pursue the telos of  the effectiveness of  European law, more than the protection of  
the claimant’s rights. This is a typical international law feature. M. Graziadei, Rights in the 
European Landscape: A Historical and Comparative Profile, in S. Prechal & B. van Roermund, The 
Coherence of  EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 63 – 90, 89, in relation to the 
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clarification of the principle of Member State liability, as a result of  CJEU 
creativity, and continuous interaction between European Courts and national 
judges. In the case of State liability, the Court’s aim was to enhance the principle 
of effectiveness of EU law, which is not limited to making the meaning of a rule 
clear, but also to it being effectively applied or producing the desired effects. 
Indeed, the CJEU stated that State liability for breach of European law should 
be seen as a necessary corollary of the doctrine of direct effect46. As a result, the 
principle of Member State liability has been progressively clarified and extended 
also in the case of infringement of European law attributable to a decision by a 
national court adjudicating at last instance47.  
The area of State liability for breach of European law is one of the classical 
cases where the CJEU is guided by the principles of primacy and effectiveness 
of European law, equivalence and autonomy of Member States, which interact 
and temper each other reciprocally48. The balancing between these principles in 
the area of State liability for breach of European law is related to the complex 
nature of the remedy. Using reparation to protect European citizens whose 
rights have been violated as a result of a breach of European law directly 
influences the relationship between citizens and Members States to which the 
                                                 
46 Francovich, para. 3: “The full effectiveness of  Community rules would be impaired and the protection of  
the rights which they grant would be weakened if  individuals were unable to obtain reparation when their rights 
are infringed by a breach of  Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible. Such a 
possibility of  reparation by the Member State is particularly indispensable where the full effectiveness of  
Community rules is subject to prior action on the part of  the State and where, consequently, in the absence of  
such action, individuals cannot enforce before the national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community 
law. It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals by 
breaches of  Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of  the Treaty. 
A further basis for the obligation of  Member States to make good such loss and damage is to be found in 
Article 5 of  the Treaty, under which they are required to take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure the implementation of  Community law, and consequently to nullify the unlawful 
consequences of  a breach of  Community law”.  
47 In the Köbler case the CJEU ruled that “The principle that Member States are obliged to make good 
damage caused to individuals by infringements of  Community law for which they are responsible is also 
applicable where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of  a court adjudicating at last instance where 
the rule of  Community law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious 
and there is a direct causal link between that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties.” 
48 According to the principle of  primacy (CJEU Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 3) 
and the principle of  effectiveness (CJEU Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 1141) of  
European law, national procedural rules may not be so framed as to render virtually impossible 
or excessively difficult the exercise of  rights conferred by European law. In conformity with 
the principle of  national procedural autonomy, the CJEU has often stated that it is for the 
“domestic legal system of  each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the 
procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of  the rights which citizens have 
from direct effect of  Community law”. On the other hand, this principle is tempered by the principle 
of  equivalence, according to which remedies under European law cannot be treated less 
favourably than remedies under national law. These principles have been studied and applied 
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violation is attributable. In other words, State liability directly affects the 
relationship between the European Union and Member States, and recently was 
even applied to adjudication.  
This principle, applied also to judicial function, is a reaffirmation of the 
primacy of European law and of the universality of remedies. On the other 
hand, it undermines the finality of last instance decisions and establishes a more 
hierarchical relationship between the CJEU and national supreme courts. In 
other words, the point of balance between principles has been shifted in favour 
of the effectiveness of European law. Especially in the Traghetti del Mediterraneo 
SpA v Repubblica italiana and Commission v. Italy cases49, the CJEU applied the 
Köbler precedent even more directly, establishing that Italian legislation had 
imposed requirements which were stricter than those of a manifest infringement 
of the applicable law, and for this reason directly violated European law50. These 
are only the most evident cases where the CJEU, in stating that a national law 
infringes European law51, has modified the balance between the 
Europeanization of remedies and respect for national autonomy. In general, 
these cases demonstrate that, at this respect, there are evident points of 
resistance in national case-law.  
As is well known, while the CJEU established the three conditions for 
State liability, the national courts must apply them, and everything that is not 
regulated at European level must be regulated at national level. This involves 
many important areas, such as “the admissibility of an action, locus standi of the 
                                                 
49 Judgment of  the Court (Grand Chamber) of  13 June 2006, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v 
Repubblica italiana, Case C-173/03, ECR I-05177; Judgment of  the Court (Third Chamber) of  
24 November 2011, Case C-379/10, European Commission v Italian Republic. 
50 Traghetti del Mediterraneo, para. 46: “Community law precludes national legislation which excludes 
State liability, in a general manner, for damage caused to individuals by an infringement of  Community law 
attributable to a court adjudicating at last instance by reason of  the fact that the infringement in question results 
from an interpretation of  provisions of  law or an assessment of  facts or evidence carried out by that court. 
Community law also precludes national legislation which limits such liability solely to cases of  intentional fault 
and serious misconduct on the part of  the court, if  such a limitation were to lead to exclusion of  the liability 
of  the Member State concerned in other cases where a manifest infringement of  the applicable law was 
committed, as set out in paragraphs 53 to 56 of  the Köbler judgment”.  
51 For this reason, recently Italian doctrine has been very active in this field. See G..M. Flick, 
La responsabilità civile dei magistrati. Proposte di modifica fra disinformazione e realtà, in federalismi.it, 11, 
2012, pp. 1 - 10; F. Bonaccorsi, Clausola di salvaguardia e responsabilità dello Stato per l'illecito del 
magistrato, in Danno e Responsabilità, 10, 2012, pp. 981 - 990; N. Trocker, L'Europa delle Corti 
sovranazionali: una storia di judicial activism tra tutela dei singoli ed integrazione degli ordinamenti giuridici , 
in Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi, 2011, pp. 91 - 128; F.P. Luiso, La responsabilità 
civile, in Foro Italiano, 10, 2011, pp. 285 - 290; M.P. Iadicicco, Integrazione europea e ruolo del giudice 
nazionale, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 2, 2011, pp. 393 - 446; N. Zingales, 
Member state Liability vs. National Procedural Autonomy: What Rules for Judicial Breach of  EU Law?, 
in German Law Journal, 11, 4, 2010, pp. 419 - 438; V. Amato, La responsabilità dello Stato giudice. 
Profili civilistici interni, in Persona e danno, www.personaedanno.it, 2010, pp. 1 - 37; A. Lazari, "Là 
où est la responsabilité, là est le pouvoir". Il nuovo ruolo del giudice nel paradigma comunitario dopo la sentenza 
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applicant, time limits for bringing action, evidential rules, nature or categories 
of damage to be compensated, its assessment, the calculation of compensation 
to be paid, the form of redress, the award of interest”52. For these reasons, the 
“Francovich doctrine” has been assimilated in a rather variable way in domestic 
legal systems. Indeed, especially in the last few years, this has been an area of 
much judicial creativity, influenced by two main factors. Primarily, national 
courts can apply the “Francovich principle” by selecting rules and legal concepts 
from their own national legal system. This means that their discretion is 
expanded, once the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are fulfilled, 
because actions for damages are governed by national rules on liability53.  
The vagueness of the three conditions leaves great discretion as regards 
their concretion to national judges, and further possibility for developing judicial 
creativity54. Indeed, the clearest factor encouraging judicial creativity is the 
vagueness of the “sufficiently serious breach” of European Law55 (or, in other 
words, “whether the Member State has manifestly and gravely disregarded the 
limits on its discretion”); it has been developed and clarified in those CJEU 
judgments which in the last fifteen years have progressively extended the 
Francovich remedy to new forms of breach56. With these judgments, “in terms of 
legal analysis, the Court has concentrated on elaborating the condition of 
seriousness of the breach. In terms of judicial policy, the cases evince a tendency 
to leave more matters to national courts and, perhaps, in some respects a tactical 
relaxation of liability”57. Accordingly, national courts apply the broad concept 
laid down by the CJEU, taking the legal content from their own national legal 
                                                 
52 S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, 293.  
53 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 67.  
54 R. Caranta, On Discretion, in S. Prechal, B. Van Roermund, The Coherence of  EU Law. The search 
for unity in divergent concepts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 183 - 215: “Liability 
actions are an almost ideal field for a comparative review of  discretion at European level” at 196. 
55 The ambiguity of  the division of  functions between the CJEU and the national courts, as 
well as the complex application of  the three conditions by the English courts, have been 
recently analysed in P. Giliker, English Tort Law and the Challenge of  Francovich liability: 20 years on, 
in Law Quarterly Review, 128, 2012, pp. 541 – 563, 551. Referring to the second condition, 
national courts only follow guidelines laid down by the CJEU in order to determine whether 
the threshold of  seriousness has been reached.  
56 In Judgment of  the Court of  4 July 2000, Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung 
Nordrhein, Case C-424/97, ECR 2000, I-05123, para 2, the CJEU stated that “In order to determine 
whether a mere infringement of  Community law by a Member State constitutes a sufficiently serious breach, a 
national court hearing a claim for reparation must take account of  all the factors which characterise the situation 
put before it. Those factors include, in particular, the clarity and precision of  the rule infringed, whether the 
infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of  law was excusable or 
inexcusable, and the fact that the position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the 
adoption or maintenance of  national measures or practices contrary to Community law”.  
57 T. Tridimas, Liability for Breach of  Community Law: Growing up and Mellowing down?, in D. 
Fairgrieve, M. Andenas, J. Bell, Tort Liability of  Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, BIICL, 
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culture58. As many scholars have pointed out, judges are products of specific 
national legal systems, they absorb specific features of their national legal 
culture, and adopt their own legal reasoning and a consequent distinctive style 
of framing and resolving legal questions59. In applying and clarifying the 
condition of seriousness of breach, balancing principles and judicial dialogue 
operate at maximum level. In fact, the vagueness of this condition and the 
CJEU’s indicators to national judges for determining the seriousness of the 
infringement demonstrate that this is very much the kind of field which can 
enhance the dynamics of incremental cooperation between judges and the 
consequent mutual influence called “cross-fertilisation”60. Thus, national judges 
are not limited to applying national law in compliance with European law; they 
can also interpret the remedy according to their national legal structures61.  
In the area of State liability some analogies can be seen between European 
judicial cooperation and equity, because of the wide area of discretion left by 
the CJEU to national autonomy. However, instead of only one court, there are 
                                                 
58 That is a “cryptotype”: see R. Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law 
(Installment II of  II), in American Journal of  Comparative Law, 39(2), 1991, pp. 343 - 401, 387: 
“Normally, a jurist who belongs to a given system finds greater difficulty in freeing himself  from the cryptotypes 
of  his system than in abandoning the rules of  which he is fully aware. This subjection to cryptotypes constitutes 
the "mentality" of  the jurist of  a given country, and such differences in mentality are the greatest obstacle to 
mutual understanding between judges of  different systems. Cryptotypes may be identified and explored only 
through the use of  comparison at a systemic and institutional level”.  
59 Moreover, “other features of  national legal culture include a particular understanding of  the role of  courts 
in relation to legislative bodies, differing specifically on the extent to which judges “make” law in the process of  
interpretation and application of  legislative provisions and the extent to which they can fill the gaps in those 
provisions”. W. Mattli, A. Slaughter, The Role of  National Courts in the Process of  European Integration: 
Accounting for Judicial Preferences and Constraints, in A. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet, J.H.H. Weiler, 
The European Court of  Justice and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence, Hart, Oxford, 1998, 
pp. 252 - 276, 272. 
60 J. Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of  Administrative Law in Europe cit., supra, 165.  
61 M. Künnecke, Divergence and the Francovich Remedy in German and English Courts, in S. Prechal, 
B. Van Roermund, The Coherence of  EU Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 233 – 253, 233. In general terms, they can even decide on 
the nature of  the remedy, applying European law directly or some equivalent national rule. 
This topic, further discussed at the end of  this section, relates to the equivalence of  the 
European principle with the possible equivalent in national law. In Judgment of  the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of  26 January 2010, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales SAL v. 
Administración del Estado, Case C-118/08, ECR 2010, I-00635, the CJEU stated that “In relation 
to the principle of  equivalence, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, this requires that 
all the rules applicable to actions apply without distinction to actions alleging infringement of  European Union 
law and to similar actions alleging infringement of  national law”. That means that, in order to determine 
whether the principle of  equivalence has been complied with, it is necessary to decide whether, 
in the light of  their purpose and their essential characteristics, the action for damages brought 
by the claimant, alleging breach of  European Union law, and the action that could have been 
brought through a national specific remedy (e.g. a specific remedy for judicial liability), may be 
regarded as similar. This decision will have many consequences on the rules which must be 
applied to the case, as well as the potential mutual influence between the European and 
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as many “Equity courts” as there are national legal systems. As in the 
relationship between the English courts of common law and of Chancery in the 
past, in the area of Member State liability national judges have also often put up 
resistance to EU jurisprudence, basically for two different reasons. Firstly, there 
are the institutional difficulties that public liability for judicial acts has always 
met at national level. Judicial liability has been an extremely problematic political 
question, largely due to the peculiar features of the judicial function and 
especially its independence with respect to the other constitutional powers. As 
is well-known, judicial liability has also been conditioned by heavy restrictions 
because of the principles of the authority of res judicata and of legal certainty62.  
   Secondly, resistance appears to relate to the fact that, in the area of State 
liability for breach of European law attributable to the courts adjudicating at last 
instance, CJEU judgments can override national courts’ authority. This can be 
explained through the so-called “theory of interpretative competition” 
according to which courts have their own interests, and conflict of interests 
constitutes a limit for legal integration63. As a consequence, national courts that 
wish to resist adverse European case-law may react primarily by treating a 
harmonized area of law as a form of foreign body64. In cases of Member State 
liability for breach of European Law, national judges have tried to isolate 
European law in order to avoid the confluence between European and national 
law65. In the only Italian case where the principle of State liability for judicial 
                                                 
62 Both these questions were referred to the CJEU in the Köbler case. For the first time, the 
CJEU seems to have applied comparative methodology in order to arrive at its final ruling. 
Opinion, Advocate General Léger in the case C-224/01, Köbler, para. 77, cited in K.M. Scherr, 
Comparative Aspects of  the Application of  the Principle of  State liability for Judicial Breaches, in ERA 
Forum, 12(4), 2012, pp. 565-588, 572. The same essay analyses the “rather diverse spectrum of  
national legal concepts of  public liability for judicial breaches”.  
63 This is the inter-court competition explanation, which examines courts as bureaucracies and 
sub-bureaucracies with their own interests and bases of  institutional support. According to 
this approach, judges share certain interests, and they are primarily interested in promoting 
their independence, influence, and authority. Accordingly, they act strategically vis-à-vis other 
courts, “calculating the political context in which they operate so as to avoid provoking a response which will 
close access, remove jurisdiction authority, or reverse their decision”. Cf. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy 
cit., supra, at 46.  
64 P. Larouche & F. Chirico, Conceptual Divergence, Functionalism, and the Economics of  Convergence, 
in B. van Roermund, S. Prechal, The Coherence of  EU Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent 
Concepts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 463 - 494, 487.  
65 One of  the fundamental gaps in this field is related to the State’s liability for legislation. In 
that case the inter-court competition approach explains also the competing interest of  lower 
and higher courts with respect to legal integration. In this case, national judges have reacted in 
variable ways because it is a principle not accepted in the majority of  European Member States, 
if  we consider domestic law. For example, Italian judges have been especially reluctant to apply 
this case law. European commentators, following the national case-law of  national courts (i.e. 
the Bundesgerichtshof and the Corte di Cassazione), assert that Member State liability is a sui generis 
remedy, separated from other national remedies for governmental liability. P. Giliker, English 







22- 2013/ELC 12 
 
 
Working Paper CDCT 
breach has been applied, the Tribunale di Genova assimilated the “Francovich 
doctrine” through general liability law (Art. 2043 Civil Code) and not through 
specific regulations regarding judicial liability (l.117/88)66. This solution67 can be 
classified, in our opinion, as an attempt to block the mutual influence between 
European and national law, which arises as the logical consequence of 
integration between legal orders.  
 
6. Contract Law and Consumer Protection 
The CJEU pursues justice (cf. Art. 2 TEU, Art. 19 TEU68), in the sense of  
just and fair solutions, resulting from a balance between interacting principles, 
for any given case. In other words, justice acquires substance through principles, 
which generate detailed rules as a result of  the interpretation of  the courts69. 
The role of  the CJEU is to balance conflicting interests behind those principles, 
and achieve equilibrium between opposing forces: in this sense, justice shares 
the same root as the Latin term aequitas, and a part of  its meaning. The solutions 
of  the CJEU are quite similar to the way jus was applied in ancient Rome to 
achieve aequitas: using the law in its dynamic and open dimension, in pursuit of  
what is bonum, that is to say right, and what is aequum, that is to say fair.  
From the start, the Court of  Justice explicitly stated that “unless the Court is 
to deny justice, it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference to the rules acknowledged 
by the legislation, the learned writings and the case-law of  the Member countries70”. More 
than once the Court has affirmed that it is not sufficient to consider the textual 
data of  the written law, but “it is necessary to consider also the indications provided by 
the constitutional rules and practices of  the nine Member States” in order to establish 
whether a particular principle is to be considered common to all71. The reference 
                                                 
66 Ruling of  the Tribunale di Genova, 23 aprile 2008.  
67 E. Scoditti, Violazione del diritto dell'Unione europea imputabile all'organo giurisdizionale di ultimo 
grado: una proposta al legislatore, in Foro Italiano, I, 2012, pp. 22 - 26; V. Piccone, La responsabilità 
del giudice nell’ordinamento integrato, in personaedanno.it, 2011, pp. 1 - 16. 
68 Art. 2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. Art. 19 (1): “The Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. Member States shall provide remedies sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.” 
69 On the function of  principles, see T. Tridimas, The General Principles of  the EU Law, Oxford, 
2006 (interpretative, derogating and supplementing functions); compare it with C. Sieburgh, 
Principles in Private Law: From Luxury to Necessity – Multi-layered Legal Systems and the Generative Force 
of  Principles, in ERPL, 2012, pp. 295–312 (who, to these, added the generative function), at 
300. The entire issue 2/2012 of  the ERPL is focused on principles and the law. 
70 Cf. joined cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57, Algera & others v. Common Assembly of  the European Coal 
& Steel Community, [1957] ECR I- 81. 
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to general principles and their impact on private law72, or to principles of  private 
law73 came later as regards the area of  State liability, for instance with the Bellone 
case (1998)74 and with Leitner (2002)75. It has continued in recent decisions, such 
as the Mangold case (2005)76, Hamilton case (2008)77, Messner case (2009)78, 
Sturgeon case (2009)79, and Kücükdeveci case (2010)80. 
From the principle of  freedom of  form expressed in the field of  
commercial agency contracts (Bellone), the CJEU stated the more controversial 
principle of compensation for non-material damage resulting from the non-
performance or improper performance of  the services constituting a package 
holiday (Leitner). The Court also clarified the role of  the principle of  good faith 
in distance contracts (Messner) within B2C transactions; it applied the principle 
of  non-discrimination on the grounds of  age in employment contracts (Mangold 
and Kücükdeveci)81, and finally recognized a general “principle of  limitation”82 
placing a time-limit on exercise of  the right of  withdrawal (Hamilton), and the 
principle of  compensatory damages for delay, or loss of  time (Sturgeon)83.  
                                                 
72 The Treaties recognise fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of 
the Union’s law (see Art. 6(3) TEU) and establish that general principles, common to the laws 
of the Member States, shall apply in the case of  non-contractual liability (see Art. 340(2) 
TFEU). 
73 For a comprehensive analysis, C. Mak, Hedgehogs in Luxemburg? A Dworkinian Reading of the 
CJEU’s Case Law on Principles of Private Law and Some Doubts of the Fox, in ERPL, 2012, pp. 323-
346. According to her, the first example of a case in which we find a clear reference to 
“principles of civil law” is case C-277/05, [2007], Société thermale d’Eugénie-les-Bains v. Ministère de 
l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, ECR I-6415.  
74 C-215/97 [1998] ECR I-2191, paragraph 15. See E. Arroyo i Amayuelas, B. Pasa, A. Vaquer 
Aloy, Form, in ACQUIS Principles, Contract II: General Provisions, Delivery of Goods, Package Travel 
and Payment Services, Munich, Sellier, 2009: Comments to Art. 1-304, pp. 75 ff. 
75 Case C-168/00 [2002] ECR I-2631. 
76 Case C-144/04 [2005] ECR I-9981. Cf. M. Beyer-Katzenberger, Judicial activism and judicial 
restraint at the Bundesverfassungsgericht: Was the Mangold judgement of  the European Court of  Justice an 
ultra vires act?, in Era forum, 2011, 11, pp. 517–523; M. Dougan, In defence of  Mangold?, in A. 
Arnull, C. Barnard, M. Dougan & E. Spaventa. (eds.) A Constitutional Order of  States? Essays in 
EU Law in Honour of  Alan Dashwood, Hart Publ., 2011, pp. 219-244. 
77 Case C-412/06 [2008] ECR I-2383. 
78 Case C-489/07 [2009] ECR I-7315. 
79 Joined cases C-402 & 432/07 [2009] ECR I-10923. 
80 Case C-555/07 [2010] ECR I-365. 
81 The CJEU applied also the principle of  non-discrimination on the grounds of  sexual 
orientation. See L. Pech, Between judicial minimalism and avoidance: The Court of  Justice’s sidestepping 
of  fundamental constitutional issues in Römer and Dominguez, in CML Rev. 2012, pp. 1841-1864, 
at 1842.  
82 Cf. the opinion of  the AG Maduro, who handles the question in Interpreting European Law. 
cit., supra. 
83 See K. Riesenhuber, Interpretation and judicial development of  EU private Law. The example of  the 
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In the Sturgeon case, the CJEU even re-drafted a piece of  European 
legislation differently from the EU legislature, to the advantage of  consumers84. 
The preliminary ruling related to Regulation n. 261/2004 that laid down 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of  
denied boarding, flight cancellations, or long flight delays. The Regulation 
grants, in case of  cancellation, a number of  rights to passengers, including 
compensation, while in case of  delayed flights compensation is not provided 
for. The CJEU held that these provisions were against the equal treatment 
principle, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated 
differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless 
such treatment is objectively justified. The CJEU argued that the situation of  
passengers whose flights are delayed is comparable with the situation of  
passengers whose flights are cancelled, because a “long delay”85 results in a 
comparable “loss of  time” suffered equally by both types of  passengers. The 
Court then decided that the damage should be redressed by compensation. The 
Regulation was not annulled, but interpreted broadly, to justify a conclusion that 
was contrary to the literal interpretation of  the Regulation itself. In this case the 
Court demonstrated that it is willing to “oppose the free market to the advantage 
of  consumers”86. 
Clearly the CJEU has been one of  the key actors in the creation of  the 
internal market, engaging in both negative integration, with the dismantlement 
of  national barriers to promote free competition inside the common market, 
and positive integration, through the principle of  mutual recognition. Although 
initially the CJEU was involved in the neo-liberal project to create a European 
space for free movement, without paying so much attention to the effective 
protection of  citizens (but only to categories of  people, such as consumers, 
customers, and clients), at present it is counterbalancing some bias in this 
process, and is promoting the anti-discrimination test on grounds of  nationality, 
of  age, and of  gender, acting also in the private law domain as a “socially activist 
Court”87. On this last point, it appears to be impossible to predict whether the 
CJEU is ready to take responsibility for promoting social welfare in the realm 
                                                 
flying claims? The Sturgeon case law in light of  judicial activism, Euroscepticism and Eurolegalism, 50 
CML Rev., 2013, pp. 15-46. 
84 Cf. the scholars reactions in different Member States: J. Balfour, Airline Liability for Delays: 
The Court of  Justice of  the EU Rewrites EC Regulation 261/2004, in Air and Space Law, 35(1), 2010, 
pp. 71-75; L. González Vaqué, Reglamento nº 261/2004 sobre asistencia y compensación de los pasajeros 
aéreos: el TJCE clarifica (ma non troppo) los conceptos de retraso y cancelación de un vuelo, in Unión Europea 
Aranzadi 3, 2010, pp. 7-17; A. Leandro, Passeggeri con diritto al rimborso forfettizzato anche quando il 
volo ha un ritardo di tre ore, in Guida al Diritto, 49, 2009, pp. 111-113; J. Stuyck, Indemnisation pour 
les passagers de vols retardés en Europe, in La Semaine Juridique, 7, 2010, pp. 359-363. 
85 “Long delay” was interpreted contextually within the “extraordinary circumstances”, of  the 
Recital 15 of  the Regulation. 
86 Garben cit., supra, at 36. 
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of  private law88. Nevertheless, these recent judgments are interesting because 
they explore the boundaries of  the CJEU’s function in relation to the political 
process89. The Court has found general principles within the common legal 
traditions of  European Member States, and has reformulated them within the 
framework of  European law, sometimes circumventing the intentions of  the 
European legislature. 
In fact, the Court’s activism is criticized for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, according to the “horizontal separation of  powers” objection, the 
judiciary should respect the prerogatives of  the democratically elected 
legislature. On the other hand, by trespassing over the limit of  its judicial 
function, the CJEU, as a supranational judiciary, creates law extrapolating rules 
from (allegedly common) general principles to the detriment of  national courts, 
especially with respect to their independence and other constitutional powers 
(“vertical separation of  powers” objection).  
The Wünsche judgment90 made it clear that a national court can make 
“further reference” to the CJEU when it does not understand how to apply the rule 
expressed in a CJEU precedent; but the national court cannot use this right to 
refer further questions to the CJEU to contest the validity of  its precedents. 
Otherwise, the areas of  jurisdiction of  national courts and of  the CJEU would 
be subverted91. However, national courts can dissent without further reference 
to the CJEU, simply deciding not to apply the CJEU precedent to the case92. 
                                                 
88 Cf. H-W. Micklitz (ed.), The Many Concepts of  Social Justice in European Private Law, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publ. 2011; for an early critique of  the technical, neutral and apolitical character 
of  the European Contract Law projects see Social Justice Study Group, Social Justice in European 
Contract Law: A Manifesto, in European Law Journal, 10(6), 2004, pp. 653-674; U. Mattei & F. G. 
Nicola, A ‘Social Dimension’ in European Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, in 
Global Jurist, Vol. 7:1 (Frontiers), 2007, Article 2, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss1/art2; for outcomes see M. W. Hesselink, CFR & Social 
Justice, Centre for the Study of  European Contract Law, Working Paper Series No. 2008/04 available 
at http://www.sssup.it/UploadDocs/3330_SSRN_ID1152222_code764687.pdf. 
89 Cf. N. Baeten, Judging the European Court of  Justice: The Jurisprudence of  Aharon Barak Through a 
European Lens, in Columbia Journal of  European Law, 18(1) 2011, pp. 135-155, at 148. 
90 Case 69/85, [1986] ECR I- 947. See also Art. 104 (5) of  the Rules of  Procedure of  The 
Court of  Justice , OJ EU L 265/1, 29.9.2012, and Art. 43 of  the Statute of  the Court of  Justice 
of  the European Union, OJ EU C 83/210, 30.03.2010. 
91 For example, the CJEU did not decide on some preliminary rulings after Sturgeon, which 
could have been considered against the Wünsche doctrine: cf. the Order of  the President of  the 
CJEU of  17 January 2013 a propos of  the Van de Ven, case, (Case C-315/11, discussed in 
Garben, cit., at 31), ordering that the case be removed from the Register (OJ EU C 108/18, 
13.4.2013). 
92 For example, German and English courts decided to suspend any claim in respect to 
compensation for delay, until the CJEU provided “additional justification” to Sturgeon, deciding 
other preliminary rulings from the High Court of  Justice (England & Wales) Queen’s Bench 
Division (admin. Court) (Joined cases C-581/10 & 629/10, [2012] TUI Travel plc, not yet 
published) and from Landgericht Köln, (Case C-413/11, [2013], Germanwings, OJ EU C 225/41, 
3.8.2013). The two cases were eventually decided reiterating the interpretation of  the EU 
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This means that, although Art. 4 TEU imposes a general duty of  loyalty on 
national and supranational institutions to give full effect to EU law, judicial 
activism is amplified at national level by the fuzzy judicial activism of  domestic 
courts, that can boycott European judgments.  
Differing behaviors may be observed in national courts: traditionally, the 
courts of  last instance resist and the lower courts follow the CJEU’s precedents. 
Lower courts are generally willing to apply CJEU precedents because, by 
adhering to the Court’s precedent and applying the principle of  supremacy and 
direct effect, they can bypass the national judicial hierarchy. Moreover, contrary 
to the highest jurisdictions within the Member States, they do not feel 
constrained by the specific duty to protect the national Constitution and to 
guarantee predictability and legal certainty93. However, evidence of  their 
resistance is to be found in the controversy which developed in Germany, the 
UK and the Netherlands after the Sturgeon case in 2011, where, German and 
English courts decided to suspend any claim with respect to compensation for 
delay, until the CJEU provided additional justification to Sturgeon94. Consistency 
would demand that a lower court should be bound by the CJEU interpretation 
and should not re-interpret this again95. On the other hand, most national 
supreme courts or constitutional courts support the “activism through self-
empowerment of  the CJEU”96, because they prefer to use a consistent 
interpretation (reading in/out, reading down the legal rules contained in the 
transposition measures or in the Regulations or Treaties), rather than an 
annulment or dis-application of  the rule. An interpretation in conformity with 
one of  the general principles97 is more deferential and respectful of  the 
legislative process as regards an annulment.  
In any case, the CJEU’s contextual and teleological interpretations of  
principles used to fill the gaps highlight the fact that law and policy issues should 
go together. They should be reasonable, consistent and adequate to serve the 
                                                 
whose flights are delayed and those whose flights are cancelled to be treated equally, because 
they suffer the same loss of  time, which is not governed by the Montreal Convention on 
certain rules on international carriage by air. For an overview cf. also C. Zatschler, European 
Union Litigation, in European Review of  Contract Law, 8(4), 2012, pp. 456–469. 
93 Cf. De Witte, Direct effect, Primacy and the nature of  Legal order cit., supra; K. Alter, Explaining 
National Court Acceptance of  European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of  Theories of  Legal 
Integration, in A. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet & J.H.H. Weiler, The European Court cit., supra, pp. 
227-252, at 232. 
94 See the example in ft. 92. 
95 A common idea in the U.K.: Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th ed., London, 2008, 
pp. 167 ff.; already in Rupert Cross & James W. Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th ed., 
Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1991, pp. 178 ff. 
96 Garben, cit. supra, at 34. 
97 For example, equal treatment in the Sturgeon case, from which the CJEU derives the principle 
of  compensatory damages for loss of  time; or prohibition of  discrimination on grounds of  
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interests of  the citizens. They should be debated in a broader institutional 
framework.  
Briefly, on the policy issues: it is particularly curious that in the Law of  
Contract and Consumer Protection the CJEU omits any reference to the 
Charter of  Fundamental Rights after the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty, 
given that the Charter “has the same legal value as the Treaties” (Art. 6.1 TEU). 
As a primary source of  EU law, any reference to it would render the judicial 
activism of  the CJEU more acceptable: the national judges may be more willing 
to enforce a Charter, or a Constitution containing principles and rules, 
disregarding any national provision contrary to it, than to follow CJEU 
precedents based on general principles. An express reference to the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights of  the EU could legitimize, within the separation of  
powers doctrine, the judicial activism of  the CJEU. This approach would 
reassure national courts and governments, who would feel the horizontal 
separation of  powers threat to a lesser extent. At the same time, it would not 
irritate common lawyers, because the “new common law as an interpretation of  
a statute” is gaining importance in daily adjudication of  private law claims in 
England98. What matters is doing justice for the parties in the case99.  
Differences, nevertheless, will continue to exist among national legal 
systems.  
The judiciary is a bureaucracy, not only an epistemic community: judges 
are civil servants working for the State100. The 28 judiciaries of  the Member 
States and the CJEU are not neutral arbiters in the process of  adjudication. A 
                                                 
98 See A. S. Burrows, The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law of  Obligations, 
128 Law Quarterly Review, 2012, pp. 232-259, at 240. Statute law cannot have the effect of  
freezing or turning back the development of  the common law; moreover, statute law can be 
used by analogy in developing the common law (as the interpretation of  the Human Rights 
Act 1998 gave stimulus to stronger protection of  privacy for breach of  confidence, see 
Campbell v. Mirror Group of  Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22). This is not to be confused with 
the different idea of  “equity of  the statute”. The mediaeval idea, which raised a different 
question as to how far one can interpret a statue by analogy, fell out of  favor in the 18th century 
because it allowed much room for the courts to enlarge statutes so as to apply them to 
situations that were not covered by the words of  the statutes but were regarded by the courts 
as within the spirit of  the law and analogous. See P. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 
MLR 1, 1985, at 7 ff. As against this view, some commentators have noted that the two 
processes merely differ in degree and not in kind. N. Mac Cormick wrote that the process of  
reasoning from or with precedents is not radically different from that of  reasoning from or 
with statutes: the differences are in fact at most differences of  degree, not in kind. Cf. the 
author in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford, 1978, at 213. Cf. N. Mac Cormick, R. S. 
Summers, Interpreting Statues: A Comparative Study, London, 1991, pp. 178 ff. 
99 Burrows, cit. at 247. 
100 In Europe the selection and appointment of  judges is not political (as in the USA), but 
depends on academic qualifications and practical experience, and (in civil law countries) on a 
state exam as well. See Alter, Establishing the Supremacy, cit., at 47; D. Piana, Judicial Accountabilities 
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theory of  judicial interests101  has been outlined starting from the assumption 
that political interests are inherent to the legal process, and that in this process 
some actors win while others lose. Judges’ specific interests are primarily their 
independence (legal autonomy from political bodies), their authority (the court 
is a strategic actor in calculating the political context in which it operates, so as 
to avoid the risk of  provoking a reaction that reverses its decision) and their 
influence (the ability to make decisions that influence the policy process); these 
are the key factors which qualify the judiciary and its activity. So, differences are 
not necessarily a product of  technical (legal) factors, such as an interpretation 
“not in conformity” with European law, or a failure to recognize certain 
principles of  private law that other national courts apply, due to the common law 
vs. civil law division.  
The case of  good faith illustrates this point well. The general view among 
commentators appears to be that in English contract law a principle of  good 
faith of  general application is absent102. However, as Mr. Justice Leggatt noted 
recently103:  
“It would be a mistake, moreover, to suppose that willingness to recognise a 
doctrine of  good faith in the performance of  contracts reflects a divide between civil 
law and common law systems or between continental paternalism and Anglo-Saxon 
individualism. Any such notion is gainsaid by that fact that such a doctrine has long 
been recognised in the United States. The New York Court of  Appeals said in 1918: 
"Every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it": Wigand 
v Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co, 222 NY 272 at 277. The Uniform Commercial 
Code, first promulgated in 1951 and which has been adopted by many States, provides 
in section 1-203 that “every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation 
                                                 
101 Alter, Establishing the Supremacy, cit. at 45 ff. 
102 Chitty on Contract Law (31st ed.), Vol 1, 2012, para 1-039, pp. 31 ff. On the “traditional 
English hostility” towards a doctrine of  good faith see also McKendrick, Contract Law (9th 
ed.), 2012, pp. 221 ff. Cf. the following observations of  Bingham LJ in Interfoto Picture Library 
Ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433 at 439: “In many civil law systems, and perhaps 
in most legal systems outside the common law world, the law of  obligations recognises and enforces an overriding 
principle that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not simply mean 
that they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal system must recognise; its effect is perhaps 
most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as ‘playing fair', ‘coming clean' or ‘putting one's cards 
face upwards on the table.' It is in essence a principle of  fair open dealing… English law has, characteristically, 
committed itself  to no such overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated 
problems of  unfairness.” 
103 Yam Seng Pte Limited v. International Trade Corporation Limited, [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), 
01/02/2013. It was a claim for breach of  contract and misrepresentation, brought by YSP, a 
distributor in Singapore, against ITC, an English supplier. The goods in question were some 
fragrances bearing the brand name of  the football team “Manchester United”. The distribution 
agreement gave YSP the exclusive right to promote and sell these products in duty-free markets 
throughout Far East and China. At the time the agreement was entered into, however, ITC 
had not yet acquired all the rights it purported to license. The issue at stake is whether an 
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of  good faith in its performance or enforcement.”104. Similarly, the Restatement 
(Second) of  Contracts states in section 205 that ‘every contract imposes upon each 
party a duty of  good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement’. ”105.  
Leggatt went on to say:  
“Under English law a duty of  good faith is implied by law as an incident of  
certain categories of  contract, for example contracts of  employment and contracts 
between partners or others whose relationship is characterised as a fiduciary one. I 
doubt that English law has reached the stage, however, where it is ready to recognise 
a requirement of  good faith as a duty implied by law, even as a default rule, into all 
commercial contracts. Nevertheless, there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the 
established methodology of  English law for the implication of  terms in fact, in 
implying such a duty in any ordinary commercial contract based on the presumed 
intention of  the parties (…) As a matter of  construction, it is hard to envisage any 
contract which would not reasonably be understood as requiring honesty in its 
performance. The same conclusion is reached if  the traditional tests for the implication 
of  a term are used. In particular the requirement that parties will behave honestly is 
so obvious that it goes without saying. Such a requirement is also necessary to give 
business efficacy to commercial transactions.”106.  
Not surprisingly, this implicit recognition of  good faith in all commercial 
contracts within English law emerged after that the controversial Academic 
Common Frame of  Reference was published (the well-known ‘tool-box’ for 
harmonizing European private law107), and a new Regulation on the optional 
instrument for European Sales Law (CESL) proposed108. In these instruments, 
which are paving the way for a European restatement (or codification) of  
contract (or private) law, “good faith and fair dealing” is a recognized principle, 
based on Treaties such as the Treaty on the Functioning of  the EU, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights109.  
While a sort of  codification of  the Law of  Contract110 has become the 
main object of  the full (targeted) harmonization strategy of  the European 
legislature, the CJEU case-law is showing in this field, and in the inter-related 
                                                 
104 According to D.G. Baird, Pre-contractual disclosure duties under the Common European Sales Law, 
in 50 CML Rev., 2013, pp. 297-310, at 298, the UCC was remarkably successful in unifying the 
commercial law of  fifty different jurisdictions and good faith and fair dealing is entirely in the 
mainstream of  the American commercial law tradition.  
105 See the judgment Yam Seng Pte Limited, at para. 125. 
106 See paras. 131 and 137 of  the judgment Yam Seng Pte Limited. 
107 See supra ft. 11 and 34. 
108 On the issues of  good faith and fair dealing in the courts’ assessment on the basis of  the 
DCFR and CESL provisions, cf. S. Whittaker, Operation of  the Common European Sales Law, 50 
CML Rev., 2013, pp. 85-108, at 104 ff. 
109 Cf. the Introduction to the DCFR cit., supra. On the definition of  good faith see Comments 
Book I, Art. 1:103. 
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field of  consumer contracts and consumer protection111, that principles of  
private law are used to mediate the liberal perspective with a socially-oriented 
approach: for example, the principle of  freedom of  contract with the good faith 
and fair dealing principle, where the latter is used as a rule of  interpretation for 
the “moralization” of  contract law.  
Conflicting interests, that is a high level of  economic performance on one 
side, and public policies aimed at protecting disadvantaged parties on the other 
side, have recently found a compromise in the so-called “result-oriented” 
approach112. As the CJEU recently recalled “in applying national law, the national 
court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of  the 
wording and the purpose of  the directive, in order to achieve the result pursued by that directive 
and thereby comply with the third paragraph of  Article 288 TFEU”113. The CJEU 
assumes that national rules which go beyond the scope of  a directive are 
prohibited, because they would run counter to the directive’s full harmonization 
strategy.  
This is well illustrated also by the CJEU’s judgments on the unfairness of  
terms in consumer contracts under Art. 3.1 of  Directive 93/13114. In order to 
substantially define the concept of  “unfair term”, the CJEU provides guidance 
to national courts as to how to apply the interpretation provided in response to 
a request for a preliminary ruling. However, it does not rule on the application 
of  these general criteria in a given case, because the national court is entitled to 
                                                 
111 As we said above, after much and still unresolved debate, the area of  contract law is 
understood as comprising consumer protection as well (both B2B and B2C transactions). This 
is reflected, at national level, in the adoption of  a monist model, according to which the rules 
on consumer protection have been inserted into the Civil code (as in the case of  the BGB in 
Germany). It is less evident in other countries that adopted the dualist model, i.e. a Consumer 
code separate from the Civil code (as in the case of  France, Italy and Spain, for example), 
where nevertheless Civil Codes rules are used to fill the gaps of  the consumer law. 
112 The two-track concept of  full harmonization is traced in V. Mak, Full Harmonization in 
Europe Private Law: a two-track concept, in ERPL 2012, pp. 213-236. The “result oriented” 
approach is to be found in contract law and has been adopted in recent cases on Unfair 
Commercial Practice, while the “basis of  liability” approach has been developed by the Court 
of  Justice interpreting the Product Liability Directive in Commission v. France , Case C- 52/2000 
[2002] ERC I – 3827, and it is applied to tort law (both are discussed in her article).  
The point is that both approaches, “basis of  liability” and “result-oriented”, are still possible 
in their respective areas of  development (product liability and unfair commercial practices); 
however, these approaches are perhaps no longer appropriate for the CJEU, since the 
European institutions now view EU integration more in terms of  full harmonization. 
113 Case C-428/11, Purely Creative Ltd, et al. v. Office of  Fair Trading [2012], nyr.: the preliminary 
ruling concerns interpretation of  paragraph 31 of  Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC on 
Unfair Commercial Practices. It comes from the Court of  Appeal (England and Wales) (Civil 
Division); the dispute was between five undertakings specialized in the distribution of  mailings 
together with a number of  people who had worked for those undertakings and the Office of  
Fair Trading (OFT), which is responsible for enforcing consumer protection laws, regarding 
the practices used by the trader. 
114 For a synthesis, cf. J. Stuyck, Unfair terms, in G. Howells, R. Schultze (eds.), Modernising and 
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decide itself  whether a contract term is unfair115. It is for national courts to 
explain the significance of  what is contrary to the requirement of  good faith 
causing a significant imbalance of  the parties’ rights and obligations arising from 
the contract. In fact, it requires evaluation of  the particular legal context, to be 
balanced against any other relevant elements, such as the nature of  goods and 
services for which the contract was concluded, all the circumstances attending 
the conclusion of  the contract and all the other terms of  the contracts (or of  
another contract on which it is dependent), according to Art. 4.1 Dir. 93/13. 
Although Member States currently seem to converge towards acceptance of  a 
general duty of  good faith and fair dealing in contracting, national courts may 
seize on the wording of  the general principle and use the metaphorical open 
texture language of  good faith116, leaving unchanged the existing discrepancies 
among national legal systems117. Thus, there remains considerable room for 
increasing judicial intervention, notwithstanding the CJEU’s detailed guidance: 
the attempt to balance the plurality of  values and principles underlying private 
law with the goal of  substantive justice leaves considerable room to manoeuvre to 
national judges, who give effect to principles at national levels118 .  
 
7. Final Remarks 
In this paper we have examined the function of  gap-filling by the CJEU 
in the European legal space and the potential existence of  a ‘European equity’. 
In conclusion, if  a European equity exists, it expresses the core principles central 
to justice, and it is used by the CJEU in balancing conflicting interests behind 
general principles. Moreover, this concept is essential to achieve compromise 
between the European Union and the Member States, whose main actors are 
citizens who are both national and European citizens at the same time. 
Accordingly, the system can work as a whole only if  European equity is applied 
in the interest of  European citizens. In fact, the telos of  the principle of  
supremacy is that national courts are required to give immediate effect to 
provisions of  directly effective European law in cases which arise before them, 
                                                 
115 Cf. Freiburger case, C-237/02 [2004] ECR I-3403, overruled to Océano Grupo Editorial 
judgment C-240-244/98 [2000] ECR I-4941, where the CJEU was willing to hold a term 
“unfair” in a consumer contract under Directive 93/13. Cf. also the Pereničová and Perenič 
judgment, Case C-453/10 [2012], nyr; Invitel  judgment, Case C-472/10, [2012], nyr; Banco 
Español de Crédito judgment, Case C-618/10 [2012], nyr; and also the RWE Vertrieb AG 
judgment, Case C-92/11 [2013], nyr. 
116 See C. Balzanella, L. Morra, P. Rossi, Metaphor in legal language: clarity or obscurity?, in 
Cacciaguidi- Fahy S. & Wagner A. (eds.), Clarifying Legal Drafting: Practice and Tools, Oxford, 
Peter Lang, 2006; and B. Pasa, Old terms for new concepts in consumer contracts? in Jean Monnet Working 
Papers NYU School of  Law, n. 09/07, pp. 1-31, 2007, at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/070901.html, at 11 ff. 
117 Cf. L. Antoniolli, F. Fiorentini (eds.), A Factual Assessment of  the Draft Common Frame of  
Reference, Munich, Sellier, 2010, at 255. 
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and to ignore or to set aside any national law which could impede the application 
of  European law. On the other side, the principle of  equivalence is aimed at 
preventing discrimination (European or national) based on rights that have been 
infringed. Finally, the principle of  national autonomy permits European citizens 
to enforce their rights according their own national legal rules, which they will 
be most familiar with. 
  Analysis of  the function of  gap-filling reveals similarities between 
European judicial creativity and the Chancellor’s jurisdiction which developed 
in England from the 14th century. In its attempts to fill lacunae, the CJEU acts 
under the Treaties, and formally respects the legal order where it operates. The 
CJEU creates its doctrines according to European law, but sometimes against 
existing national legal rules and principles, in the same way that the Chancellor’s 
doctrines “followed the law”: they were formally compatible with the common law 
Courts’ jurisdiction, but they substantially impinged on the application of  
common law rules. 
  National courts are also developing a similar function, filling the lacunae 
left by European law within national remedial frameworks; however, the 
relationship between European and national levels, as we said above, is 
conflictual. At the same time, European equity encompasses all general 
principles provided for by the common constitutional traditions of  the Member 
States and international instruments, and this can make interaction less 
conflictual119.  
  Considerable criticism of  the CJEU’s activism reflects national 
governments’ concerns regarding the multi-layer system of  European private 
law in general. In addition, national courts’ resistance against the alleged 
competence of  the CJEU to extrapolate common principles of  private law from 
more general values is due to the lack of  a shared methodology for distilling 
principles120, as well as of  a common policy on what should be the driving or 
underlying principles in European private law121. In this respect, commentators 
have noted both the “EU-friendly approach” of  national constitutional and 
supreme courts, and the “boycotting decisions” of  national lower courts122. 
Consistency would demand that national courts should be bound by the CJEU 
interpretation and should not re-interpret the case again. But the judiciary is a 
                                                 
119 Cf. Mak cit., supra, 338. 
120 Mak cit. 338; see also A. Metzger, Extra legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im 
Europäischen Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck, 2009; Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons cit., supra. 
121 See also Mak, Constitutional Aspects of  a European Civil Code, in A.S. Hartkamp, M.W. 
Hesselink, E.H. Hondius, C. Mak, C.E du Perron, (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 4th ed, 
Kluwer, 2011, at 347; M.W. Hesselink, If  You don’t Like Our Principles We have Others. On Core 
Values and Underlying Principles in European Private Law: A Critical discussion on the New Principles 
Section in the Draft Common Frame of  Reference, in R Brownsworth, H-W. Micklitz, L. Niglia, S. 
Weatherill (eds.), The Foundations of  European Private law, Hart publ., Oxford, 2011, pp. 59-71. 
122 See for example the German Constitutional Court’s Honeywell, BVerfG 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 
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bureaucracy, as we recalled above. Adjudication, in the sense of  application of  
the law, requires value judgments, which will inevitably be political. While judges 
present themselves as neutral, operating under the fidelity-to-law doctrine, many 
allegedly neutral judicial opinions are not convincingly so123. This raises the 
question of  what really determines operational rules, beyond arguments 
claiming to be based on principles used by judges124. Legalism fails with its 
assumption that legal reasoning is conclusive and that it alone shapes judicial 
behaviour: legal texts and legal methods alone can seldom resolve interpretative 
disagreement. Neo-realism fails because it misidentifies how political factors 
shape judicial behaviour, overstating the link between judges and national 
interest. Neo-functionalism125 seems to be more promising because it 
recognizes that judges, like all actors in a legal system, pursue their “self-
interest”; but how judicial self-interest is defined remains unclear126. 
                                                 
123 D. Kennedy, A Critique of  Adjudication (fin de siècle), Harvard, 1998, at pp. 29 ff., distinguishes 
five general strategies dealing with the question. The first (neutrality) associated with classical 
positivism of  Hart; the second one associated with Kelsen, Unger and others, showing the 
opposite, i.e. that the application of  a rule cannot be isolated from subjective influences 
(relying on linguistic philosophers); the third position associated with Oliver W. Holmes, which 
accepts that what is not rule application is at least methodologically indistinguishable from 
judicial legislation; the fourth position associated with Cardozo, Llewellyn, Fuller, Hart and 
Sacks, to Ronald Dworkin, which proposes a middle term in between rule application and 
judicial legislation, through the method of  “coherence” or “fit”, a method that is focused on 
the choice among different proposed rules to fill the gap (the judge is making law, but without 
consulting his own preferences, because he is following a prior case or other rules of  the 
system enacting the system itself, in other words, he is following a rational plan; a fifth position, 
that he called the civil law version of  adjudication, which addresses the problem from the 
presumption that the Code is the coherent framework with a particular conceptual structure, 
and when the case cannot be solved by semantic or deductive analysis then the judge will apply 
a teleological approach, in order to disclose the social purpose of  the norm. 
124 The distinction between operational rules and legal concepts (i.e. symbolic sets of  rules) 
implies that is necessary to deconstruct the law beyond the peculiar legal discourse of  one 
legal system, in order to understand how the legal actors of  the system are working. Cf. R. 
Sacco, Legal formants cit., supra. The phenomenon is explained through the theory of  legal 
formants which are all those formative elements that make any given legal rule (such as statutes, 
general propositions, particular definitions, judgments, reasons, holdings, customs, and usage). 
All of  these formative elements are not necessarily coherent with each other within each 
system. Only domestic jurists assume such a coherence. On the contrary, legal formants are 
usually conflicting and can better be pictured in a competitive relationship with one another. 
Thus, within a given legal system, the rules are not uniform, not only because one rule may be 
given by case law, another by scholars and yet another one by statutes. Within each one of  
these sources formants also compete with each other. 
125 A-M. Burley, W. Mattli, Europe before the Court, in International Organization, 47(1), 1993, pp. 
41-76. 
126 Accordingly, the CJEU’s legal thought could not shape national courts behavior. Through 
the neo-functionalist approach, the European legal system has expanded and prospered by 
creating individual incentives to motivate actors within European institutions and within 
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  Opposition by national courts during recent years has led the CJEU to 
practise judicial minimalism (or self-restraint). To avoid rupture with national 
courts, the CJEU can find reasons not to apply existing precedents to a specific 
case, or find a way to avoid certain policy issues, exactly as it is doing in the 
private law domain. Thus, the interaction between national and supranational 
judges is not so dramatic, as described by some authors with reference to 
apocalyptic metaphors127. We have analysed two specific areas in order to 
consider to what extent we can share these catastrophic points of  view. Our 
conclusion is that we need fresh contributions to the debate on the European 
multi-layer system of  adjudication from a private comparative law perspective. 
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